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Abstract:	  Most	  reductionist	  accounts	  of	  intentional	  joint	  action	  include	  a	  condition	  that	  it	  must	  be	  common	  knowledge	  between	  participants	  that	  they	  have	  certain	  intentions	  and	  beliefs	  that	  cause	  and	  coordinate	  the	  joint	  action.	  However,	  this	  condition	  has	  typically	  simply	  been	  taken	  for	  granted	  rather	  than	  argued	  for.	  The	  condition	  is	  not	  necessary	  for	  ensuring	  that	  participants	  are	  jointly	  responsible	  for	  the	  action	  that	  each	  participates	  in,	  nor	  for	  ensuring	  that	  each	  treats	  the	  others	  as	  partners	  rather	  than	  as	  social	  tools.	  It	  is	  thus	  something	  of	  a	  mystery	  why	  the	  condition	  is	  so	  widely	  accepted.	  By	  rejecting	  three	  arguments	  that	  could	  potentially	  support	  it,	  I	  argue	  that	  reductionists	  should	  get	  rid	  of	  the	  condition.	  I	  show	  that	  the	  first	  two	  arguments	  fail.	  While	  the	  final	  argument	  is	  intuitively	  compelling,	  it	  builds	  on	  key	  premises	  that	  are	  unavailable	  to	  the	  reductionist.	  	   	  
This	  is	  a	  preprint	  of	  an	  article	  whose	  final	  and	  definitive	  form	  will	  be	  published	  in	  the	  Australasian	  Journal	  of	  Philosophy	  2015.	  The	  Australasian	  Journal	  of	  Philosophy	  is	  available	  online	  at:	  http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals/.	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1 Introduction	  What	  is	  required	  for	  several	  agents	  to	  intentionally	  act	  together?	  According	  to	  reductionist	  accounts,	  intentional	  joint	  action	  can	  be	  understood	  by	  exclusive	  appeal	  to	  conceptual	  resources	  that	  are	  anyway	  needed	  for	  understanding	  intentional	  singular	  action	  in	  a	  social	  context.	  An	  intentional	  joint	  action	  is	  simply	  a	  joint	  action	  that	  is	  caused	  and	  coordinated	  by	  an	  interpersonal	  structure	  of	  ordinary	  propositional	  attitudes	  with	  certain	  contents.	  Using	  a	  technical	  term,	  we	  can	  refer	  to	  this	  structure	  as	  the	  agents’	  ‘shared	  intention’.	  For	  instance,	  according	  to	  Pettit	  and	  Schweikard’s	  reductionist	  account,	  several	  agents	  are	  engaged	  in	  an	  intentional	  joint	  action	  only	  if:	  1. they	  each	  intend	  that	  they	  enact	  the	  [joint]	  performance;	  2. they	  each	  intend	  to	  do	  their	  bit	  in	  this	  performance;	  3. they	  each	  believe	  that	  others	  intend	  to	  do	  their	  bit;	  and	  4. they	  each	  intend	  to	  do	  their	  bit	  because	  of	  believing	  this	  [that	  others	  intend	  to	  do	  their	  bit].	  	   [Pettit	  and	  Schweikard	  2006:	  23]	  For	  our	  lifting	  of	  the	  table	  to	  be	  jointly	  intentional,	  it	  isn’t	  sufficient	  that	  each	  intentionally	  lifts	  one	  end	  of	  it	  in	  the	  expectation	  that	  the	  other	  will	  intentionally	  lift	  the	  other	  end.	  A	  natural	  first	  thought	  then,	  is	  that	  for	  you	  and	  I	  to	  intentionally	  jointly	  J,	  each	  must	  intend	  that	  we	  J,	  that	  we	  enact	  a	  joint	  performance	  of	  some	  sort	  (condition	  1	  above).	  Of	  course,	  each	  of	  us	  must	  also	  intend	  to	  lift	  our	  own	  end	  of	  the	  table—do	  our	  bit	  of	  the	  J-­‐ing—to	  participate	  in	  the	  joint	  action	  (condition	  2).	  Since	  the	  reductionist	  aims	  to	  provide	  an	  informative	  non-­‐circular	  analysis	  of	  intentional	  joint	  action,	  the	  notion	  of	  ‘joint	  performance’	  or	  of	  ‘our	  J-­‐ing’	  that	  figures	  in	  the	  content	  of	  each	  participant’s	  intentions	  cannot	  be	  the	  notion	  of	  intentional	  joint	  action	  (this	  will	  play	  a	  crucial	  role	  in	  the	  arguments	  that	  follow).	  Pettit	  and	  Schweikard	  therefore	  insist	  that	  a	  joint	  performance	  ‘can	  be	  conceptualized	  just	  as	  a	  pattern	  of	  behavior	  in	  which	  our	  different	  efforts	  combine	  to	  effect	  a	  certain	  result.’	  [ibid.:	  29]	  Similarly,	  Bratman	  argues	  that	  our	  J-­‐ing	  can	  be	  conceptualised	  as,	  for	  example,	  each	  of	  us	  J-­‐ing	  where	  this	  is	  compatible	  with	  each	  doing	  this	  ‘in	  ignorance	  of	  the	  other	  person’s	  activity’	  [1997a:	  52].	  Intentional	  joint	  action	  is	  characterised	  by	  at	  least	  a	  minimal	  form	  of	  intentional	  cooperation.	  The	  notion	  of	  ‘doing	  one’s	  bit’	  in	  conditions	  2–4	  should	  therefore	  be	  understood	  (by	  analyst	  and	  participants	  alike)	  as	  a	  voluntary	  and	  uncoerced	  contribution	  to	  the	  joint	  performance	  [Pettit	  and	  Schweikard	  2006:	  22].	  Hence,	  cases	  where	  an	  agent	  treats	  another	  as	  a	  social	  tool	  rather	  than	  as	  a	  partner	  are	  ruled	  out	  by	  conditions	  3	  and	  4.	  In	  Bratman’s	  [1992;	  1993]	  reductionist	  account,	  this	  is	  achieved	  by	  requiring	  that	  each	  participant	  intends	  both	  (i)	  that	  they	  J	  ‘in	  accordance	  with	  and	  because	  of’	  the	  other’s	  intention	  that	  they	  J,	  and	  (ii)	  that	  they	  J	  by	  way	  of	  subplans	  that	  ‘mesh’	  (see	  [1992:	  331–34]).	  Agents’	  sub-­‐plans	  mesh	  if	  they	  are	  co-­‐realisable.	  In	  the	  table-­‐lifting	  case,	  our	  sub-­‐plans	  mesh	  if	  we	  intend	  to	  lift	  at	  opposite	  ends	  of	  the	  table,	  but	  not	  if	  we	  intend	  to	  lift	  at	  the	  same	  end.	  Requirement	  (i)	  rules	  out	  cases	  in	  which	  one	  participant	  intends	  that	  they	  J	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in	  ways	  that	  bypass	  the	  other’s	  intentional	  agency,	  such	  as	  in	  the	  case	  where	  I	  intend	  that	  we	  drive	  to	  Melbourne	  by	  way	  of	  knocking	  you	  unconscious	  and	  putting	  you	  in	  the	  trunk	  of	  my	  car	  rather	  than	  by	  way	  of	  your	  intention	  that	  we	  drive	  there.	  Requirement	  (ii)	  rules	  out	  cases	  in	  which	  one	  participant	  intends	  to	  deceive	  or	  manipulate	  the	  other.	  For	  example,	  suppose	  that	  I	  intend	  that	  we	  drive	  to	  Melbourne	  by	  taking	  the	  inland	  Hume	  Highway	  but	  I	  know	  that	  you	  intend	  that	  we	  drive	  there	  by	  taking	  the	  coastal	  Princes	  Highway.	  However,	  I	  deceive	  you	  into	  thinking	  that	  I	  intend	  that	  we	  take	  the	  Princes	  Highway	  too,	  while	  I	  actually	  intend	  to	  drive	  onto	  the	  Hume	  Highway	  as	  soon	  as	  you	  fall	  asleep.	  I	  could	  not	  rationally	  intend	  this	  if	  I	  also	  had	  the	  intention	  that	  my	  and	  your	  subplans	  mesh.	  If	  a	  joint	  action	  is	  appropriately	  caused	  by	  the	  intentions	  and	  beliefs	  specified	  by	  1–4,	  is	  it	  then	  an	  intentional	  joint	  action?	  Initially,	  one	  might	  think	  that	  the	  answer	  is	  ‘yes’.	  The	  participants	  will	  each	  treat	  the	  others	  as	  partners	  rather	  than	  social	  tools	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  joint	  performance.	  Due	  to	  the	  required	  interdependence	  between	  the	  participants’	  intended	  contributions,	  they	  will	  also	  be	  ‘responsible	  together	  for	  an	  action	  in	  which	  they	  each	  participate’	  [Pettit	  and	  Schweikard	  2006:	  19–22].	  After	  all,	  each	  settles	  whether	  the	  whole	  performance	  is	  enacted.	  Note	  that	  this	  doesn’t	  mean	  that	  they	  are	  jointly	  responsible	  as	  a	  
group.	  The	  notion	  of	  joint	  responsibility	  that	  is	  relevant	  here	  is	  a	  distributive	  notion	  of	  each	  being	  responsible	  for	  the	  entire	  joint	  performance	  that	  they	  each	  intentionally	  bring	  about	  by	  doing	  their	  bit	  (see	  Sverdlik	  [1987];	  Bratman	  [1997b:	  32]).	  Nevertheless,	  Pettit	  and	  Schweikard’s	  answer	  is	  ‘no’.	  The	  following	  fifth	  condition	  must	  also	  be	  satisfied:	  5. they	  each	  believe	  in	  common	  that	  the	  other	  clauses	  hold.	  They	  unpack	  this	  common	  belief	  or	  common	  knowledge	  condition	  (henceforth	  CK-­‐condition)	  as	  follows:	  The	  clause	  stipulates	  that	  everything	  amongst	  the	  parties	  is	  above	  board.	  Take	  any	  question	  that	  might	  arise	  as	  to	  whether	  I	  am	  really	  aware	  of	  what	  is	  happening,	  or	  really	  aware	  of	  our	  each	  being	  aware	  of	  what	  is	  happening,	  or	  really	  aware	  of	  our	  each	  being	  aware	  of	  our	  each	  being	  aware	  of	  what	  is	  happening,	  and	  so	  on.	  The	  clause	  stipulates	  that	  we	  are	  each	  disposed	  to	  give	  an	  affirmative	  response	  to	  such	  a	  question;	  in	  that	  sense,	  we	  are	  aware	  of	  what	  is	  happening,	  aware	  of	  our	  each	  being	  aware	  of	  this,	  and	  so	  on	  in	  the	  usual	  hierarchy	  of	  common	  belief	  (Lewis	  1969).	  [Pettit	  and	  Schweikard	  2006:	  23–24]	  Most	  reductionist	  accounts	  include	  such	  a	  necessary	  CK-­‐condition	  (e.g.	  [Tuomela	  and	  Miller	  1988;	  Cohen	  and	  Levesque	  1991;	  Bratman	  1992,	  1993;	  Miller	  2001;	  Tollefsen	  2005;	  Alonso	  2009]).1	  However,	  the	  condition	  is	  typically	  merely	  assumed	  rather	  than	  argued	  for.	  For	  instance,	  Miller	  submits	  that	  ‘mutual	  knowledge	  is	  what	  distinguishes	  joint	  action	  from	  interdependent	  action	  that	  is	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Kutz	  [2000],	  Ludwig	  [2007]	  and	  Bratman	  [2014]	  present	  reductionist	  accounts	  without	  a	  necessary	  a	  CK-­‐condition.	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not	  joint’,	  but	  never	  explains	  why	  mutual	  knowledge	  has	  this	  transformative	  power	  [2001:	  60].	  Tollefsen	  claims	  that	  joint	  attention	  as	  well	  as	  common	  knowledge	  can	  ‘introduce	  the	  openness	  that	  needs	  to	  be	  present	  in	  cases	  of	  joint	  action’,	  but	  doesn’t	  explain	  why	  this	  openness	  is	  needed	  [2005:	  92].	  Bratman	  similarly	  introduces	  the	  CK-­‐condition	  by	  simply	  asserting	  that	  ‘it	  seems	  reasonable	  to	  suppose	  that	  in	  shared	  intention	  the	  fact	  that	  each	  has	  the	  relevant	  attitudes	  is	  itself	  out	  in	  the	  open,	  is	  public.’	  [1993:	  103]	  (but	  see	  [2014:	  57–58]).	  Note	  that	  ‘mutual	  knowledge’,	  ‘openness’	  and	  talk	  of	  attitudes	  being	  ‘public’	  are	  different	  ways	  of	  referring	  to	  what	  I	  refer	  to	  as	  ‘common	  knowledge’.	  In	  this	  paper,	  I	  argue	  that	  reductionists	  should	  reject	  the	  CK-­‐condition	  as	  a	  necessary	  condition	  for	  intentional	  joint	  action	  as	  such.	  In	  §2,	  I	  present	  a	  case	  in	  which	  all	  conditions	  except	  the	  CK-­‐condition	  are	  satisfied	  according	  to	  both	  Pettit	  and	  Schweikard’s	  [2006]	  account	  and	  Bratman’s	  [1993]	  account.	  Three	  arguments	  for	  the	  CK-­‐condition	  are	  then	  considered	  in	  §3,	  §4	  and	  §5	  in	  light	  of	  this	  case.	  I	  reject	  the	  first	  two	  arguments.	  While	  there	  may	  be	  something	  to	  the	  third	  argument,	  I	  argue	  that	  it	  isn’t	  available	  to	  the	  reductionist.	  I	  set	  aside	  whether	  non-­‐reductionists	  should	  also	  reject	  a	  necessary	  CK-­‐condition	  for	  two	  reasons.	  First,	  it	  is	  not	  altogether	  clear	  whether	  non-­‐reductionists	  who	  include	  a	  CK-­‐condition,	  such	  as	  Tuomela	  [2007],	  are	  targeting	  the	  same	  phenomenon	  as	  the	  reductionists.	  Secondly,	  non-­‐reductionists	  have	  access	  to	  argumentative	  resources	  that	  are	  unavailable	  to	  reductionists	  (but	  at	  the	  cost,	  of	  course,	  of	  a	  less	  parsimonious	  ontology).	  Hence,	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  whether	  criticising	  the	  three	  arguments	  I	  focus	  on	  here	  suffices	  for	  drawing	  conclusions	  about	  non-­‐reductionist	  accounts.	  
2 A	  joint	  performance	  without	  common	  knowledge	  Consider	  this	  case:	  Hector	  and	  Celia	  are	  about	  to	  build	  a	  block	  tower.	  Each	  intends	  that	  they	  build	  a	  block	  tower,	  and	  each	  intends	  to	  do	  their	  bit	  of	  this	  joint	  performance.	  Pettit	  and	  Schweikard’s	  conditions	  1	  and	  2	  are	  thus	  satisfied.	  Recall	  that	  this	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  each	  intends	  to	  do	  their	  bit	  of	  intentionally	  jointly	  building	  a	  block	  tower,	  but	  merely	  that	  each	  intends	  to	  do	  their	  bit	  of	  enacting	  a	  pattern	  of	  behaviour	  in	  which	  their	  different	  efforts	  combine	  to	  the	  effect	  that	  the	  block	  tower	  is	  built.	  Hector	  and	  Celia	  each	  believes	  that	  the	  other	  intends	  to	  do	  their	  bit,	  and	  each	  believes	  that	  the	  other	  conceives	  of	  the	  intended	  bit	  as	  a	  bit	  of	  the	  joint	  performance	  (in	  other	  words,	  each	  believes	  that	  the	  other	  intends	  that	  they	  build	  a	  block	  tower).	  Condition	  3	  is	  thus	  satisfied.	  Furthermore,	  it	  is	  in	  virtue	  of	  believing	  this	  that	  each	  intends	  to	  do	  their	  bit:	  Each	  intends	  to	  do	  their	  bit	  of	  the	  joint	  performance	  because	  the	  other	  intends	  to	  do	  their	  bit	  of	  it.	  Hence,	  condition	  4	  is	  also	  satisfied.	  Suppose	  also	  that	  each	  intends	  that	  their	  subplans	  for	  building	  the	  block	  tower	  mesh	  with	  the	  subplans	  of	  the	  other.2	  These	  intentions	  and	  beliefs	  appropriately	  cause	  Hector	  and	  Celia	  to	  build	  the	  block	  tower,	  that	  is,	  the	  attitudes	  cause	  them	  to	  take	  turns	  putting	  blocks	  on	  top	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Conditions	  1	  and	  2	  of	  Bratman’s	  [1993]	  account	  of	  shared	  intention	  would	  thus	  be	  satisfied.	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of	  each	  other	  so	  that	  a	  block	  tower	  is	  built.3	  Celia	  starts	  by	  putting	  down	  one	  of	  her	  blocks,	  Hector	  then	  puts	  down	  a	  block	  on	  hers,	  and	  so	  on	  until	  the	  tower	  is	  completed.	  Note	  that,	  as	  a	  side	  effect,	  the	  attitudes	  cause	  Hector	  to	  cover	  the	  top-­‐face	  of	  each	  of	  Celia’s	  blocks.	  Now,	  suppose	  that	  Hector	  falsely	  believes	  that	  Celia	  falsely	  believes	  that	  he	  intends	  to	  cover	  the	  top-­‐face	  of	  each	  of	  her	  blocks	  rather	  than	  do	  his	  bit	  of	  their	  joint	  performance.	  Hector	  thus	  falsely	  believes	  that	  conditions	  3	  and	  4	  in	  Pettit	  and	  Schweikard’s	  account	  aren’t	  satisfied.	  This	  means	  that	  Pettit	  and	  Schweikard’s	  CK-­‐condition	  isn’t	  satisfied.	  This	  is	  true	  even	  given	  an	  undemanding	  understanding	  of	  common	  knowledge	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  ‘negatively	  characterised	  notion	  [of]	  mutual	  absence	  of	  doubt.’	  [Davies	  1987:	  717]	  Such	  a	  weak	  CK-­‐condition	  requires	  that	  the	  participants	  each	  lack	  false	  beliefs	  concerning	  whether	  the	  other	  conditions	  hold.	  But	  Hector	  has	  such	  a	  false	  belief.	  According	  to	  the	  account,	  Hector	  and	  Celia’s	  joint	  performance	  of	  building	  the	  block	  tower	  cannot,	  then,	  be	  an	  intentional	  joint	  action.	  Note	  that	  Hector’s	  false	  belief	  can	  be	  present	  and	  persist	  while	  Hector	  and	  Celia	  successfully	  execute	  their	  intentions	  that	  they	  build	  a	  block	  tower	  (that	  is,	  conditions	  1–4	  can	  continue	  to	  hold	  true).	  The	  false	  belief	  can	  persist	  without	  any	  failure	  of	  rationality	  on	  the	  part	  of	  either	  Hector	  or	  Celia,	  even	  if	  each	  is	  fully	  aware	  of	  their	  success	  in	  each	  doing	  what	  they	  each	  intend	  to	  do.	  Hector	  can	  attribute	  to	  Celia	  the	  intention	  that	  they	  enact	  the	  pattern	  of	  behaviour	  in	  which	  their	  efforts	  combine	  to	  the	  effect	  that	  a	  block	  tower	  is	  built	  while	  also	  mistakenly	  attributing	  to	  her	  the	  false	  belief	  that	  he	  just	  intends	  to	  cover	  each	  of	  her	  blocks.	  He	  can	  do	  this	  without	  thinking	  that	  Celia	  is	  irrational,	  since	  a	  pattern	  of	  behaviour	  in	  which	  their	  efforts	  combine	  to	  the	  effect	  that	  a	  block	  tower	  is	  built	  can	  in	  part	  be	  formed	  by	  Hector’s	  intentional	  covering	  of	  the	  top-­‐face	  of	  each	  of	  Celia’s	  blocks.	  Furthermore,	  the	  false	  belief	  does	  not	  stop	  Hector	  from	  intending	  that	  their	  subplans	  for	  building	  the	  block	  tower	  mesh.	  Finally,	  for	  all	  we	  know,	  Hector’s	  false	  second-­‐order	  belief	  may	  be	  justified.	  His	  intentions	  and	  beliefs	  may	  have	  a	  perfectly	  rational	  etiology.4	  This	  kind	  of	  case	  may	  seem	  extraordinarily	  rare.	  But	  consider	  any	  type	  of	  joint	  activity	  that	  can	  also	  be	  performed	  by	  a	  singular	  individual,	  such	  as	  going	  for	  a	  walk	  or	  making	  a	  hollandaise	  sauce.	  In	  such	  a	  joint	  activity,	  one	  party	  may	  falsely	  believe	  that	  the	  other	  mistakenly	  thinks	  that	  she	  herself	  intends	  to	  carry	  out	  the	  activity	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  other	  joins	  her	  (so	  that	  the	  satisfaction	  of	  the	  intention	  is	  compatible	  with	  the	  other’s	  involvement,	  but	  doesn’t	  require	  it).	  I	  may	  falsely	  believe	  that	  you	  are	  under	  the	  mistaken	  impression	  that	  I	  simply	  intend	  to	  go	  for	  a	  walk,	  rather	  than	  that	  I	  intend	  that	  we	  go	  for	  a	  walk	  (that	  is,	  what	  we	  are	  supposing	  that	  each	  actually	  intends).	  Such	  false	  higher-­‐order	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Something	  akin	  to	  Bratman’s	  ‘connection	  condition’	  is	  thus	  satisfied	  (see	  [1992:	  339]).	  4	  Hector	  will	  then	  be	  in	  a	  Gettier	  situation	  with	  respect	  to	  his	  first-­‐order	  belief	  about	  Celia’s	  intention	  [Gettier	  1963].	  Note	  that	  while	  it	  may	  be	  that	  Hector	  must	  believe	  that	  he	  will	  φ	  in	  order	  to	  intend	  to	  φ	  (see	  §3),	  he	  need	  not	  know	  that	  he	  will.	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beliefs	  are	  arguably	  a	  common	  upshot	  of	  insecurities	  and	  mild	  forms	  of	  paranoia	  that	  are	  often	  present	  in	  human	  relations.	  And	  such	  false	  higher-­‐order	  beliefs	  and	  doubts	  can	  persist	  throughout	  joint	  activities	  that	  at	  least	  appear	  to	  be	  jointly	  intentional.	  But	  if	  our	  walking	  is	  jointly	  intentional	  only	  if	  the	  CK-­‐condition	  is	  satisfied,	  then	  such	  appearances	  must	  be	  illusory.	  However,	  in	  all	  such	  cases,	  agents	  do	  not	  merely	  each	  intend	  to	  perform	  individual	  actions	  that	  accidentally	  have	  a	  joint	  effect.	  Rather,	  each	  intends	  that	  they	  enact	  the	  whole	  action.	  Due	  to	  the	  interdependence	  of	  their	  intentions,	  they	  each	  settle	  that	  they	  enact	  the	  joint	  performance.	  Each	  is	  thus	  responsible	  for	  bringing	  it	  about.	  Why	  isn’t	  such	  a	  joint	  performance	  then	  an	  intentional	  joint	  action?	  
3 The	  Rational	  Intending	  Argument	  The	  case	  of	  Hector	  and	  Celia’s	  building	  of	  the	  block	  tower	  undermines	  one	  possible	  motivation	  for	  the	  CK-­‐condition,	  according	  to	  which	  the	  intentions	  and	  beliefs	  specified	  by	  the	  other	  conditions	  will	  be	  undermined	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  common	  knowledge	  (see	  Tuomela	  and	  Miller	  [1988:	  385–87]).	  According	  to	  this	  Rational	  Intending	  Argument	  (as	  I	  call	  it),	  the	  CK-­‐condition	  is	  an	  enabling	  condition	  without	  which	  the	  other	  conditions	  cannot	  be	  satisfied.	  To	  illustrate,	  consider	  a	  case	  where	  you	  and	  I	  each	  intend	  that	  we	  walk	  down	  to	  the	  valley.	  You	  intend	  to	  do	  your	  bit	  of	  the	  walking	  because	  I	  intend	  to	  do	  my	  bit	  of	  it,	  and	  I	  intend	  to	  do	  my	  bit	  because	  you	  intend	  to	  do	  yours.	  But	  suppose	  that	  I	  mistakenly	  think	  that	  you	  believe	  that	  I	  rather	  intend	  that	  we	  walk	  up	  to	  the	  hilltop.	  If	  the	  Rational	  Intending	  Argument	  is	  sound,	  then	  my	  false	  belief	  about	  your	  belief	  about	  my	  intention	  will	  undermine	  my	  intention	  to	  do	  my	  bit	  of	  our	  walking	  down	  to	  the	  valley,	  as	  well	  as	  my	  intention	  that	  we	  walk	  there.	  The	  argument	  rests	  on	  the	  assumption	  that	  an	  agent	  can	  intend	  to	  φ	  only	  if	  she	  believes	  that	  she	  will	  φ.	  Given	  this,	  I	  can	  only	  intend	  to	  do	  my	  bit	  of	  our	  walking	  down	  to	  the	  valley	  if	  I	  believe	  that	  you	  will	  walk	  down	  to	  the	  valley.	  After	  all,	  if	  you	  don’t,	  then	  I	  will	  not	  be	  able	  to	  do	  my	  bit	  of	  our	  walking	  there.	  Since	  I	  intend	  to	  do	  my	  bit	  in	  part	  because	  you	  intend	  to	  do	  your	  bit,	  I	  must	  not	  only	  believe	  that	  you	  will	  walk	  down	  to	  the	  valley,	  but	  I	  must	  also	  believe	  that	  you	  intend	  to	  walk	  there	  (as	  your	  bit	  of	  our	  walking	  there).	  Furthermore,	  I	  realise	  that	  you	  cannot	  intend	  to	  do	  your	  bit	  of	  our	  walking	  down	  to	  the	  valley	  unless	  you	  believe	  that	  I	  will	  walk	  down	  to	  the	  valley.	  Now,	  I	  falsely	  believe	  that	  you	  believe	  that	  I	  intend	  that	  we	  walk	  up	  to	  the	  hilltop	  rather	  than	  down	  to	  the	  valley,	  so	  I	  will	  believe	  that	  you	  believe	  that	  I	  will	  not	  walk	  down	  the	  valley	  but	  rather	  up	  to	  the	  hilltop.	  Hence,	  from	  my	  mistaken	  point	  of	  view,	  you	  therefore	  cannot	  rationally	  intend	  that	  we	  walk	  down	  to	  the	  valley,	  nor	  intend	  to	  do	  your	  bit	  of	  this	  walking.	  This	  will	  in	  turn	  undermine	  my	  own	  intention.	  Thus,	  conditions	  1–4	  in	  Pettit	  and	  Schweikard’s	  account	  will	  not	  be	  satisfied.	  If	  my	  intention	  would	  be	  undermined	  if	  I	  had	  such	  a	  false	  second-­‐order	  belief,	  then	  your	  intention	  would	  also	  be	  undermined	  if	  you	  had	  a	  false	  third-­‐order	  belief	  that	  I	  had	  this	  false	  second-­‐order	  belief.	  My	  intention	  would	  in	  turn	  also	  be	  undermined	  if	  I	  had	  a	  false	  fourth-­‐order	  belief	  that	  you	  had	  such	  a	  false	  third-­‐order	  belief.	  And	  so	  on	  ad	  infinitum.	  Similarly,	  your	  intention	  would	  be	  undermined	  if	  you	  had	  a	  false	  second-­‐order	  belief	  about	  my	  belief	  concerning	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your	  intention,	  and	  so	  on	  ad	  infinitum.	  According	  to	  the	  Rational	  Intending	  Argument,	  this	  shows	  that	  participants	  cannot	  rationally	  have	  the	  attitudes	  specified	  by	  the	  other	  conditions	  unless	  it	  is	  also	  common	  knowledge	  that	  they	  have	  these	  attitudes.	  The	  case	  of	  Hector	  and	  Celia	  shows	  that	  the	  Rational	  Intending	  Argument	  fails.	  Hector’s	  intention	  that	  he	  and	  Celia	  enact	  the	  joint	  performance	  of	  building	  a	  block	  tower	  is	  not	  undermined	  by	  his	  false	  belief	  that	  Celia	  mistakenly	  thinks	  that	  he	  merely	  intends	  to	  cover	  the	  top-­‐face	  of	  each	  of	  her	  blocks.	  In	  addition,	  we	  arguably	  shouldn’t	  accept	  a	  strong	  belief	  condition	  on	  intending.5	  The	  Rational	  Intending	  Argument	  won’t	  work	  with	  only	  a	  weak	  belief	  condition	  on	  intending,	  according	  to	  which	  it	  is	  sufficient	  for	  me	  to	  intend	  to	  φ	  if	  I	  believe	  that	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  I	  will	  φ	  (see	  Kutz	  [2000:	  18];	  Ludwig	  [2007:	  387–88]).	  I	  could	  then	  intend	  to	  do	  my	  bit	  of	  our	  walking	  down	  to	  the	  valley	  in	  part	  because	  you	  intend	  to	  do	  your	  bit	  of	  this	  walk,	  even	  if	  I	  attribute	  to	  you	  the	  false	  belief	  that	  I	  rather	  intend	  to	  do	  my	  bit	  of	  our	  walking	  up	  to	  the	  hilltop.	  After	  all,	  you	  could	  intend	  to	  do	  your	  bit	  of	  our	  walking	  down	  to	  the	  valley	  because	  you	  hope	  that	  I	  will	  change	  my	  mind	  and	  start	  to	  intend	  to	  do	  my	  bit	  of	  this	  joint	  walk.	  At	  one	  point,	  Tuomela	  refers	  to	  the	  Rational	  Intending	  Argument	  as	  ‘the	  argument	  for	  rational	  and	  reliable	  action’	  [2007:	  69,	  my	  emphasis].	  In	  a	  recent	  paper,	  Paternotte	  [2015]	  argues	  that	  a	  concern	  for	  reliability	  grounds	  an	  argument	  for	  the	  necessity	  of	  the	  CK-­‐condition.	  His	  starting	  point	  is	  that	  philosophers	  take	  (or	  should	  take)	  an	  interest	  in	  the	  phenomenon	  of	  joint	  action	  because	  the	  joint	  actions	  human	  beings	  engage	  in	  have	  an	  ‘intriguing	  efficiency’	  [2015:	  74].	  Hence,	  ‘[d]efining	  joint	  action	  consists	  in	  pinning	  down	  the	  exact	  conditions	  that	  reliably	  lead	  to	  collective	  success.’	  [ibid.]	  While	  such	  an	  explanatory	  target	  certainly	  makes	  sense	  for	  some	  purposes,	  it	  typically	  hasn’t	  been	  the	  target	  of	  philosophical	  accounts	  of	  intentional	  joint	  action	  (but	  see	  [Cohen	  and	  Levesque	  1991:	  491]).	  It	  is	  true	  that	  the	  presence	  of	  CK-­‐defeating	  false	  higher-­‐order	  beliefs	  will	  typically	  make	  coordination	  of	  a	  joint	  activity	  somewhat	  precarious	  and	  inflexible.	  Other	  things	  being	  equal,	  such	  false	  beliefs	  increase	  the	  likelihood	  of	  glitches	  and	  breakdowns	  in	  communication	  and	  coordination.	  However,	  the	  importance	  of	  efficiency	  and	  robustness	  should	  not	  be	  overstated.	  Glitches	  and	  breakdowns	  rarely	  put	  a	  complete	  halt	  to	  coordination	  or	  communication	  in	  joint	  activity.	  Typically,	  they	  rather	  merely	  result	  in	  brief	  temporary	  obstacles	  that	  participants	  quickly	  overcome.	  Indeed,	  glitches	  and	  temporary	  breakdowns	  often	  provide	  important	  opportunities	  for	  learning	  [Moore	  2013:	  492–93].	  At	  any	  rate,	  the	  aim	  of	  reductionist	  accounts	  is	  to	  explicate	  the	  difference	  between	  intentional	  joint	  action	  and	  mere	  coordinated	  parallel	  activity.	  It	  is	  not	  to	  specify	  conditions	  under	  which	  joint	  action	  is	  reliably	  successful.	  Hence,	  reductionists	  cannot	  appeal	  to	  considerations	  concerning	  efficiency	  and	  reliability	  in	  support	  of	  the	  CK-­‐condition.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5Bratman	  rejects	  a	  strong	  belief	  condition	  on	  intending	  [1987:	  37–38].	  Tuomela	  rejects	  it	  in	  later	  writings	  [2007:	  113].	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4 The	  Partnership	  Argument	  Pettit	  and	  Schweikard	  preface	  the	  introduction	  of	  the	  CK-­‐condition	  with	  the	  following	  brief	  motivation:	  For	  all	  that	  these	  clauses	  [1–4]	  stipulate,	  it	  just	  might	  be	  that	  you	  do	  not	  believe	  that	  I	  believe	  that	  you	  intend	  to	  do	  your	  bit,	  let	  alone	  that	  I	  intend	  to	  do	  my	  bit	  because	  of	  believing	  this;	  for	  example,	  you	  might	  regard	  me,	  wrongly,	  as	  someone	  who	  takes	  you	  to	  be	  acting	  like	  a	  zombie,	  as	  if	  under	  hypnotic	  suggestion.	  And	  in	  such	  a	  case,	  there	  would	  be	  reasonable	  ground	  for	  denying	  that	  our	  [joint	  performance]	  should	  count	  as	  an	  unforced,	  joint	  action.	  [Pettit	  and	  Schweikard	  2006:	  23]	  Conditions	  2	  and	  3	  are	  introduced	  to	  rule	  out	  a	  similar	  kind	  of	  case,	  a	  case	  in	  which	  ‘we	  each	  thought	  that	  others	  were	  zombies	  who	  would	  automatically,	  as	  if	  under	  hypnotism,	  do	  what	  was	  required	  of	  them’	  [ibid.:	  22].	  This	  would	  be	  a	  case	  in	  which	  ‘we	  each	  thought	  of	  ourselves	  as	  the	  only	  properly	  intentional	  agent	  involved.’	  [ibid.]	  Furthermore,	  the	  conditions	  are	  necessary	  because	  in	  intentional	  joint	  action,	  each	  must	  supposedly	  view	  themselves	  as	  ‘on	  a	  par	  with	  others’	  and	  as	  ‘involved	  on	  an	  equal	  footing	  in	  the	  enterprise	  of	  the	  joint	  action.’	  [ibid.:	  23]	  As	  I	  put	  it	  in	  §1,	  conditions	  2	  and	  3	  are	  supposed	  to	  ensure	  that	  each	  treats	  the	  others	  as	  partners	  rather	  than	  as	  social	  tools.	  Hector	  doesn’t	  think	  that	  Celia	  takes	  him	  to	  be	  acting	  like	  a	  zombie,	  nor	  that	  she	  thinks	  that	  he	  isn’t	  a	  properly	  intentional	  agent.	  But	  arguably,	  there	  is	  a	  sense	  in	  which	  he	  doesn’t	  view	  himself	  and	  Celia	  as	  proper	  partners,	  as	  ‘involved	  on	  an	  equal	  footing’	  in	  their	  building	  of	  the	  block	  tower.	  The	  underlying	  idea,	  I	  think,	  is	  this:	  Part	  of	  what	  it	  is	  for	  a	  person	  X	  to	  be	  person	  Y’s	  partner	  with	  respect	  to	  their	  J-­‐ing	  is	  for	  X	  to	  view	  Y	  as	  his	  partner	  with	  respect	  to	  this	  activity.	  For	  instance,	  if	  Hector	  is	  Celia’s	  partner	  with	  respect	  to	  their	  block-­‐tower	  building,	  then	  he	  must	  view	  Celia	  as	  his	  partner	  with	  respect	  to	  this	  activity.	  Furthermore,	  Hector’s	  viewing	  Celia	  as	  his	  partner	  involves	  viewing	  her	  as	  someone	  who,	  in	  return,	  views	  him	  as	  a	  partner.	  Thus,	  Hector	  must	  view	  Celia	  as	  someone	  who	  views	  him	  as	  someone	  who	  views	  her	  as	  someone	  who	  views	  him	  as	  a	  partner,	  and	  so	  on	  and	  so	  forth.	  Viewing	  another	  as	  a	  partner	  thus	  incorporates	  a	  kind	  of	  intentional	  reciprocity	  that	  is	  incompatible	  with	  the	  presence	  of	  CK-­‐defeating	  false	  higher-­‐order	  beliefs.	  Nothing	  but	  common	  knowledge	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  have	  the	  intentions	  and	  beliefs	  cited	  in	  the	  other	  conditions	  is	  sufficient	  for	  the	  right	  kind	  of	  partnership	  to	  be	  in	  place.	  This	  Partnership	  Argument	  (as	  I	  call	  it)	  does	  not	  merely	  require	  that	  intentionally	  jointly	  acting	  agents	  treat	  each	  other	  as	  free	  intentional	  agents.	  It	  also	  goes	  beyond	  requiring	  that	  each	  is	  responsible	  for	  the	  whole	  joint	  performance,	  as	  well	  as	  beyond	  requiring	  that	  they	  each	  view	  all	  of	  themselves	  as	  jointly	  responsible	  in	  this	  sense.	  This	  should	  make	  us	  somewhat	  suspicious	  of	  the	  claim	  that	  a	  partnership	  of	  the	  kind	  required	  by	  the	  Partnership	  Argument	  is	  necessary	  for	  intentional	  joint	  action	  as	  such.	  More	  importantly,	  the	  Partnership	  Argument	  gets	  the	  required	  direction	  of	  fit	  wrong.	  What	  should	  be	  required	  is	  not	  that	  each	  agent	  views	  the	  others	  as	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partners	  (mind-­‐to-­‐world),	  but	  that	  each	  treats	  the	  others	  as	  partners	  (world-­‐to-­‐mind).	  This	  is	  what	  is	  captured	  by	  conditions	  2	  and	  3	  in	  Pettit	  and	  Schweikard’s	  account,	  according	  to	  which	  each	  participant	  must	  intend	  to	  voluntarily	  do	  their	  bit	  in	  part	  because	  the	  others	  each	  intend	  to	  voluntarily	  do	  their	  bits.	  Bratman	  captures	  this	  requirement	  with	  the	  condition	  that	  each	  must	  intend	  that	  they	  J	  ‘in	  accordance	  with	  and	  because	  of’	  the	  others’	  intentions	  that	  they	  J	  and	  that	  each	  must	  intend	  that	  they	  do	  this	  by	  way	  of	  meshing	  sub-­‐plans.	  Now,	  treating	  someone	  as	  a	  partner	  is	  perfectly	  consistent	  with	  viewing	  her	  as	  someone	  who	  doesn’t	  treat	  or	  view	  you	  as	  a	  partner.	  Even	  if	  Hector	  thinks	  that	  Celia	  neither	  treats	  or	  views	  him	  as	  a	  proper	  partner	  with	  respect	  to	  their	  building	  of	  the	  block	  tower,	  he	  can	  still	  treat	  her	  as	  a	  partner.	  Indeed,	  treating	  someone	  as	  a	  partner	  is	  often	  an	  effective	  way	  of	  getting	  him	  or	  her	  to	  start	  treating	  you	  as	  a	  partner	  in	  return.	  Still,	  one	  might	  think	  that	  Pettit	  and	  Schweikard’s	  conditions	  2	  and	  3—or	  Bratman’s	  demand	  for	  interlocking	  intentions	  and	  intended	  mesh—don’t	  adequately	  capture	  what	  it	  is	  to	  treat	  someone	  as	  a	  proper	  partner.	  After	  all,	  even	  if	  Hector	  intends	  to	  do	  his	  bit	  because	  Celia	  intends	  to	  do	  her	  bit,	  he	  may	  intend	  to	  keep	  her	  in	  the	  dark	  about	  what	  his	  intention	  is.	  He	  may	  intend	  that	  she	  continues	  to	  believe	  what	  he	  mistakenly	  thinks	  she	  believes,	  namely	  that	  he	  intends	  to	  merely	  cover	  the	  top-­‐face	  of	  her	  blocks.	  While	  Hector’s	  intention	  that	  their	  sub-­‐plans	  mesh	  puts	  some	  rational	  pressure	  on	  him	  to	  make	  his	  intention	  and	  sub-­‐plans	  manifest	  to	  Celia,	  he	  could	  still	  rationally	  have	  this	  deceptive	  intention.	  Perhaps	  Celia	  is	  usually	  a	  teaser,	  so	  Hector	  mistakenly	  thinks	  that	  she	  wouldn’t	  intend	  that	  they	  build	  a	  block	  tower	  if	  she	  knew	  that	  this	  is	  what	  he	  also	  intended.	  However,	  note	  that	  the	  CK-­‐condition	  doesn’t	  rule	  out	  this	  kind	  of	  deceptive	  intent.	  What	  is	  needed	  to	  rule	  out	  deceptive	  intent	  is	  a	  negatively	  characterised	  requirement	  like	  the	  following:6	  5´.	  	   they	  each	  do	  not	  intend	  that	  the	  others	  be	  deceived	  about	  whether	  the	  other	  clauses	  hold.	  Condition	  5´	  could	  be	  satisfied	  even	  in	  the	  presence	  of	  CK-­‐defeating	  false	  higher-­‐order	  beliefs,	  and	  the	  CK-­‐condition	  could	  be	  satisfied	  even	  if	  5´	  were	  not	  satisfied.	  A	  concern	  with	  ensuring	  that	  each	  participant	  treats	  the	  others	  as	  partners	  thus	  fails	  to	  support	  the	  CK-­‐condition.7	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  For	  a	  similar	  point	  regarding	  the	  conditions	  for	  communicative	  intent,	  see	  Grice	  [1969:	  159].	  7	  However,	  without	  the	  CK-­‐condition,	  Pettit	  and	  Schweikard’s	  account	  doesn’t	  rule	  out	  cases	  where	  participants	  falsely	  believe	  that	  there	  is	  no	  single	  joint	  performance	  that	  they	  each	  intend	  that	  they	  enact	  (and	  thus,	  where	  they	  fail	  to	  realise	  that	  condition	  1	  is	  satisfied).	  In	  such	  cases,	  participants	  arguably	  view	  themselves	  as	  involved	  in	  a	  kind	  of	  mutual	  exploitation	  rather	  than	  intentional	  cooperation.	  The	  CK-­‐condition	  is	  not	  necessary	  for	  ruling	  out	  these	  cases	  though;	  a	  condition	  that	  requires	  each	  to	  believe	  or	  assume	  that	  there	  is	  such	  a	  single	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5 The	  Agential	  Knowledge	  Argument	  Despite	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  arguments	  I	  have	  considered,	  the	  CK-­‐condition	  nevertheless	  remains	  compelling.	  If	  Hector	  and	  Celia’s	  block-­‐tower	  building	  is	  an	  intentional	  joint	  action,	  then	  Hector	  will	  be	  participating	  in	  an	  intentional	  joint	  action	  even	  if	  his	  participation	  in	  it,	  qua	  intentional	  joint	  action,	  will	  be	  unintentional.	  Intuitively,	  one	  might	  think	  that	  to	  participate	  in	  a	  joint	  intentional	  action,	  one	  must	  intentionally	  participate	  in	  it	  qua	  intentional	  joint	  action.	  This	  requires	  that	  one	  knows,	  at	  the	  very	  least,	  that	  one	  is	  trying	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  intentional	  joint	  action.	  Perhaps	  an	  appeal	  to	  such	  an	  agential	  knowledge	  that	  is	  constitutive	  of	  intentional	  joint	  action	  could	  ground	  an	  argument	  for	  the	  CK-­‐condition.	  The	  thought	  here,	  inspired	  by	  Anscombe	  [1957],	  is	  that	  there	  is	  a	  special	  sense	  of	  the	  question	  ‘Why?’	  that	  applies	  to	  an	  agent’s	  participation	  in	  a	  intentional	  joint	  action	  (see	  Laurence	  [2011];	  Schmid	  [forthcoming]).	  In	  an	  intentional	  joint	  action,	  each	  participant’s	  bit	  is	  rationalised	  by	  the	  joint	  action	  that	  it	  is	  supposed	  to	  contribute	  to	  and	  be	  part	  of.	  ‘Hector,	  why	  are	  you	  putting	  your	  block	  on	  top	  of	  Celia’s?’,	  we	  might	  ask.	  If	  their	  activity	  were	  jointly	  intentional,	  then	  Hector	  could	  respond:	  ‘I’m	  putting	  it	  there	  because	  we	  are	  building	  a	  block	  tower	  together.’	  Arguably,	  he	  wouldn’t	  intentionally	  participate	  in	  their	  joint	  activity	  of	  building	  the	  block	  tower	  (which	  wouldn’t	  then	  be	  jointly	  intentional)	  unless	  he	  knew—in	  a	  ‘non-­‐observational’	  way—that	  this	  is	  what	  they	  were	  at	  least	  trying	  to	  do.	  But	  Hector’s	  false	  second-­‐order	  belief	  seems	  to	  undermine	  such	  agential	  knowledge,	  and	  thus,	  their	  activity’s	  status	  as	  an	  intentional	  joint	  action.	  To	  rule	  out	  all	  such	  agential	  knowledge-­‐undermining	  false	  higher-­‐order	  beliefs,	  the	  CK-­‐condition	  must	  be	  introduced.	  Or	  so	  the	  argument	  would	  go.	  Of	  course,	  common	  knowledge	  is	  not	  non-­‐observational	  in	  the	  way	  that	  agential	  knowledge	  allegedly	  is.	  If	  participants	  have	  agential	  knowledge	  of	  their	  intentional	  joint	  action,	  then	  it	  must	  arguably	  be	  based	  on	  each	  participant’s	  own	  grasp	  of	  the	  content	  of	  an	  intention	  (see,	  e.g.	  Velleman	  [2007]).	  The	  thought	  then,	  is	  that	  the	  CK-­‐condition	  plays	  an	  enabling	  role	  in	  giving	  each	  participant	  this	  grasp.	  But	  in	  virtue	  of	  which	  intention	  could	  Hector	  have	  this	  agential	  knowledge?	  Presumably,	  either	  the	  shared	  intention	  in	  which	  he	  partakes	  or	  his	  personal	  intention	  that	  they	  build	  the	  block	  tower.	  Unfortunately,	  a	  reductionist	  cannot	  construct	  an	  argument	  for	  the	  CK-­‐condition	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  either.	  Consider	  first	  the	  agential	  knowledge	  provided	  by	  Hector’s	  personal	  intention.	  Recall	  that	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  joint	  performance	  isn’t	  the	  notion	  of	  an	  intentional	  joint	  action.	  Since	  neither	  Hector	  nor	  Celia	  intends	  to	  participate	  in	  an	  intentional	  joint	  action,	  neither	  needs	  the	  agential	  knowledge	  that	  they	  are	  trying	  to	  participate	  in	  an	  intentional	  joint	  action.	  When	  Hector	  responds	  to	  our	  question	  ‘Why?’,	  his	  answer—enabled	  by	  his	  grasp	  of	  the	  content	  of	  his	  personal	  intentions—should	  be	  interpreted	  as	  ‘I’m	  putting	  it	  there	  because	  we	  are	  enacting	  a	  pattern	  of	  behaviour	  in	  which	  our	  efforts	  combine	  to	  the	  effect	  that	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  joint	  performance	  suffices	  (see	  Blomberg	  [forthcoming]	  for	  an	  in-­‐depth	  discussion).	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the	  block	  tower	  is	  built.’	  His	  false	  second-­‐order	  belief	  does	  not	  undermine	  the	  knowledge	  he	  expresses	  with	  this	  answer.	  A	  more	  promising	  basis	  for	  the	  relevant	  kind	  of	  agential	  knowledge	  might	  be	  the	  shared	  intention	  itself.	  Bratman	  [1993]	  frequently	  uses	  the	  locution	  ‘our	  shared	  intention	  to	  J’	  even	  though	  the	  participants’	  intentions	  have	  the	  content	  ‘that	  we	  J’.	  This	  may	  suggest,	  misleadingly,	  that	  there	  is	  an	  object	  of	  the	  shared	  intention	  (a	  performance)	  that	  is	  different	  from	  the	  object	  of	  the	  participants’	  intentions	  (a	  state	  of	  affairs).	  Each	  participant	  must	  then	  have	  a	  grasp	  of	  a	  content	  that	  is	  different	  from	  that	  of	  his	  or	  her	  own	  personal	  intention.	  The	  CK-­‐condition	  would	  then	  be	  needed,	  one	  might	  think,	  to	  ensure	  such	  a	  grasp.	  It	  is	  not	  sufficient	  to	  merely	  add	  a	  necessary	  condition	  5*	  that	  each	  believes	  that	  conditions	  1–4	  hold.	  Each	  could	  then	  believe	  that	  5*	  didn’t	  hold	  (and	  hence,	  each	  could	  believe	  that	  they	  didn’t	  have	  their	  shared	  intention).	  Adding	  a	  condition	  6	  that	  rules	  this	  out	  won’t	  help,	  since	  each	  could	  then	  believe	  that	  6	  didn’t	  hold.	  And	  so	  on	  ad	  
infinitum.	  Nothing	  but	  common	  knowledge	  is	  sufficient	  for	  providing	  participants	  with	  the	  right	  kind	  of	  awareness	  of	  their	  shared	  intention	  to	  J.	  	  However,	  this	  argument	  is	  unavailable	  to	  reductionists.	  They	  reject	  that	  intentionally	  jointly	  acting	  individuals	  need	  to	  jointly	  form	  a	  literal	  state	  of	  intention	  that	  belongs	  to	  each	  and	  all	  of	  them.	  ‘Shared	  intention’	  is	  a	  technical	  term	  that	  refers	  to	  a	  structure	  of	  ordinary	  individual	  propositional	  attitudes,	  so	  there	  is	  no	  shared	  intention	  ‘to	  J’	  for	  participants	  to	  grasp	  (see	  Bratman	  [1993:	  98–99];	  Pettit	  and	  Schweikard	  [2006:	  30]).	  Hence,	  the	  reductionist	  cannot	  rest	  an	  argument	  for	  the	  CK-­‐condition	  on	  considerations	  concerning	  agential	  knowledge	  of	  the	  shared	  intention	  or	  of	  the	  participants’	  personal	  intentions.8	  Perhaps	  this	  is	  too	  quick.	  Ought	  not	  the	  interpersonal	  structure	  of	  shared	  intention	  play	  a	  role	  in	  shared	  agency	  that	  is	  analogous	  to	  the	  role	  that	  intention	  plays	  in	  individual	  agency?	  If	  so,	  then	  the	  structure	  should	  arguably	  provide	  participants	  with	  knowledge	  of	  the	  structure	  itself,	  in	  the	  way	  that	  an	  individual’s	  intention	  provides	  her	  with	  knowledge	  of	  what	  she	  is	  intending.	  This	  may	  be	  the	  reasoning	  behind	  Alonso’s	  claim	  that	  ‘[i]t	  is	  reasonable	  to	  think	  that	  if	  we	  have	  a	  shared	  intention	  to,	  say,	  dance	  the	  tango,	  each	  of	  us	  must	  be	  in	  a	  position	  to	  plan	  and	  act	  on	  the	  commonly	  known	  assumption	  that	  we	  have	  a	  shared	  intention	  to	  dance	  the	  tango.’	  [2009:	  458]	  But	  insofar	  as	  shared	  intention	  simply	  is	  a	  structure	  of	  attitudes	  that	  distinguishes	  intentional	  joint	  action	  from	  parallel	  action,	  this	  requirement	  is	  too	  strong.	  The	  participants’	  bilateral	  coordination	  of	  their	  plans	  and	  actions	  need	  not	  itself	  be	  commonly	  known,	  but	  may	  rather	  emerge	  out	  of	  their	  interlocking	  intentions	  and	  intended	  meshing	  of	  subplans.	  Other	  things	  being	  equal,	  these	  intentions	  will	  put	  rational	  pressure	  on	  the	  participants	  to	  make	  their	  intentions	  manifest	  to	  each	  other.	  This	  will	  tend	  to	  eliminate	  higher-­‐order	  false	  beliefs	  and	  create	  conditions	  for	  common	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  If	  a	  kind	  of	  plural	  agential	  knowledge	  of	  our	  intentional	  joint	  action	  is	  nevertheless	  constitutive	  of	  it	  being	  jointly	  intentional,	  then	  the	  reductionist	  accounts	  are	  really	  eliminativist	  accounts.	  As	  Schmid	  [forthcoming]	  puts	  it,	  the	  upshot	  of	  the	  reductionist	  approach	  would	  be	  that	  ‘what	  groups	  can	  do	  is	  really	  more	  like	  an	  emulation	  of	  one	  token	  intentional	  action	  that	  individuals	  can	  pull	  off	  if	  they	  combine	  in	  a	  suitable	  manner.’	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knowledge.	  Hence,	  structures	  of	  shared	  intention	  can	  help	  explain	  the	  prevalence	  of	  common	  knowledge	  in	  human	  groups,	  but	  the	  CK-­‐condition	  is	  not	  necessary	  for	  explaining	  intentional	  joint	  action.	  
6 Conclusion	  In	  light	  of	  my	  review	  of	  three	  arguments	  for	  the	  CK-­‐condition,	  reductionists	  about	  intentional	  joint	  action	  should	  reject	  a	  necessary	  CK-­‐condition.	  The	  presence	  of	  false	  CK-­‐defeating	  higher-­‐order	  beliefs	  is	  compatible	  with	  joint	  responsibility	  as	  well	  as	  with	  participants	  treating	  each	  others	  as	  partners	  rather	  than	  social	  tools.	  Of	  course,	  this	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  the	  best	  explanation	  of	  why	  people	  persist	  in	  having	  the	  concordant	  intentions	  and	  expectations	  required	  for	  intentional	  joint	  action	  isn’t	  often	  that	  the	  CK-­‐condition	  is	  satisfied.	  Nor	  does	  it	  mean	  that	  common	  knowledge	  doesn’t	  facilitate	  robustness,	  efficiency	  and	  flexibility	  in	  our	  joint	  endeavours.	  Finally,	  it	  doesn’t	  mean	  that	  common	  knowledge	  isn’t	  necessary	  for	  two	  agents	  to	  launch	  a	  rationally	  coordinated	  joint	  attack	  in	  circumstances	  where	  failure	  of	  coordination	  is	  very	  costly	  (see	  Chant	  and	  Ernst	  [2008:	  552–56]).	  None	  of	  this,	  however,	  shows	  that	  the	  CK-­‐condition	  is	  necessary	  for	  intentional	  joint	  action	  as	  such.9	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